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MEANS-PLUS-FUNCTION CLAIMS IN
COMPUTER RELATED PATENT
APPLICATIONS WITHIN THE
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I. INTRODUCTION
Practitioners in the United States have for some time drafted
* Partner, Lowe, King, Price & Becker, Arlington, Virginia; J.D., George Washington University.
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patent claims in means-plus-function format, particularly in claims
involving electronics more appropriately characterized by function
than by structure.1 However, means-plus-function claim drafting
has encountered obstacles caused by the same characteristic that
makes those claims valuable: breadth. This Article explores the
history of functional claim drafting in the United States and covers
issues of particular significance to means-plus-function claim drafting in computer related patent applications. The attitude of the Patent and Trademark Office toward means-plus-function claim
drafting and relevant court decisions are also discussed.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
To provide an incentive to invent, the patent system in the
United States awards to patentees the right to exclude others from
manufacture, use, or sale of the patented invention within the U.S.,
its territories and possessions for a period of seventeen years. 2 This
grant is explicitly authorized by the Constitution. 3 To receive the
grant, the inventor must make a disclosure that is full enough to enable any person skilled in the art to which the invention pertains, or
is most nearly connected, to make and use the invention. 4 This ensures that, following expiration of the patent, the public will be in
full possession of the invention.
To clearly apprise the public of the technology covered by the
patent and the technology still available, the claims must clearly define the claimed invention. This is necessary so that others will be
free to solve the same problem during the life of the patent using
non-equivalent means. Patents must encourage research, not stifle
it. Yet, the inventor must be suitably rewarded for his expenditure
of time, capital, and innovation; the public should not be permitted
to avoid the patent simply by making some modifications and producing what is essentially the same invention.
This creates a dilemma. Since the boundary defined by a claim
cannot be drafted with absolute precision, the patent draftsman
must define the invention specifically enough to enable competitors
to know when the claims are infringed.5 Conversely, the draftsman
must not draft the claims so narrowly that they cover only the specific embodiment shown in the specification. Narrow claim drafting
1. Claims may be written whereby an element thereof "may be expressed as a
35 U.S.C. § 112 (1982).
means or step for performing a specified function .
2. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1982).
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
4. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1982).
5. United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228 (1942).
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would result in a patent of little practical value, since it is almost always possible to change the elements in the disclosure while still
taking full advantage of the invention. 6 This is particularly true in
cases involving programmed computers; the same or an equivalent
result can be obtained using countless different programs beyond
the ones disclosed in the specification.
Before one can fully appreciate the problems as well as the benefits that beset means-plus-function claim language in computer related patent applications, one must first understand how the law of
such claim language has evolved in the United States in mechanical
and early electrical cases.

A.

FUNCTIONAL CLAIM DRAiF ING IN THE
UNITED STATES PRIOR TO

1952

Early Patent and Trademark Office decisions expressed hostility
toward "means" language in claims on the basis that the claims
would be too broad or would possibly cover subject matter not allowed by the patent laws.7 Litigation involving the telegraph established the early principle that a patent is limited to the elements
that produce the result claimed. 8 The Supreme Court found the following claim invalid because it was of such broad scope that the patent would tend to discourage others from seeking alternative
solutions to the application of electromagnetism in long-range
telegraphy.
IT] he essence of my invention being the use of the mode of power
of the electric or galvanic current, which I call electro-magnetism,
however developed, for making or printing intelligible characters,
letters or signs, at any distances, being a new application9 of that
power, which I claim to be the first inventor or discoverer.
However, in the Telephone Cases,'0 two methods of producing
electrical signals corresponding to voice were disclosed in the specification. The first method, thoroughly described in the specification,
used magnetic induction; the second method, only briefly described,
used resistance variation. The claim at issue was "[t]he method of,
and apparatus for, transmitting vocal or other sounds telegraphically, as herein described, by causing electrical undulations, similar
in form to the vibrations of the air accompanying the said vocal or
6.
1948).
7.
8.
9.
10.

See Royal Typewriter Co. v. Remington Rand, Inc., 168 F.2d 691, 693-94 (2d Cir.
See Ex Parte Paige, 1887 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 71, 79-80.
O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 402 (1853).
Id. at 418.
126 U.S. 1 (1887).
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other sounds, substantially as set forth.""
The Supreme Court held the claim valid, despite the "functional" language, because the claim did not cover all methods or apparatus for telegraphic transmission of sounds. Only those methods
2
that involved production of "electrical undulations" were covered.'
As later expressed by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
(C.C.P.A., now the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
(C.A.F.C.)): "[Olne may not claim all means of doing a thing by
broad means limitation and thereby throttle and prevent future inventive efforts in the line of improving such means of doing the particular thing."'13 The statute under which these early cases were
decided required the inventor to "particularly point out and distinctly claim the part, improvement, or combination which he
14
[claimed] as his invention or discovery."'
The extremes in judicial interpretation of this statute are illustrated by Continental PaperBag Co. v. EasternPaper Bag C0.1 5 and
Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker. 16 The Continental
PaperBag case dealt with a patent for a paper bag machine having
a rotating cylinder and a forming plate, both provided with side
forming fingers adapted to move toward or away from each other
during formation of a bag tube. The cylinder and forming plate of a
paper machine apparently had never before been combined, and
maintaining engagement between the plate and cylinder through a
substantial arc was a problem. The claim was:
In a paper bag machine, the combination of a rotating cylinder provided with one or more pairs of side-folding fingers adapted to be
moved toward or from each other, a forming plate also provided
with side-forming fingers adapted to be moved toward or from each
other, means for operating said fingers at definite times during the
formative action upon the bag tube, operating means for the forming plate adapted to cause the said plate to oscillate about its rear
edge upon the surface of the cylinder. . . , the whole operating for
the purpose of opening and forming the bottom17of the bag tube, and
means to move the bag tube with the cylinder.
The Court construed the claim to define not function, but rather
11. Id. at 13.
12. Id. at 537-38.
13. In re Smellie, 111 F.2d 651, 652 (C.C.P.A. 1940). See also Philip A. Hunt Co. v.
Mallinkrodt Chemical Works, 177 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1949); United Carbon Co. v. Binney
& Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228 (1942).
14. Smith, FunctionalClaims and the Patent Act of 1952, 48 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 426,
428 (1966) (citing Revised Statutes § 4888 (1873)).
15. 210 U.S. 405 (1908).
16. 329 U.S. 1 (1946).
17. Continental Paper Bag, 210 U.S. at 417.
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a mechanical means for bringing specific parts of the apparatus into
working relation. In other words, the "operating means" functionally described an element of the machine, rather than the purpose
of the machine or combination as a whole. This case was widely followed as a liberal interpretation of the early patent statute.
Halliburton, on the other hand, was the leading case for a strict
interpretation of the statute. The invention was an apparatus
designed for use in deep oil wells to measure the distance from the
well top to the fluid surface for determining pump placement. Due
to the configuration of some oil wells, direct measurement was impossible. The prior art used a sound-echo-time measurement
method wherein a pressure change was developed through a short
blast of gas, the returned echo was observed and measured, and the
oil well depth was determined. Unfortunately, sound does not travel
uniformly down all oil wells. The Walker patent, recognizing that an
oil flow pipe of a well consists of lengths of tubing that are jointed
with collars, detected the collars ultrasonically, counted the number
of pipe sections between the collars, and multiplied the count by the
length of each section. A typical claim in the Walker patent was:
In an apparatus for determining the location of an obstruction
in a well having therein a string of assembled tubing sections interconnected with each other by coupling collars, means communicating with said well for creating a pressure impulse in said well, echo
receiving means including a pressure responsive device exposed to
said well for receiving pressure impulses from the well and for measuring the lapse of time between the creation of the impulse and
the arrival at said receiving means of the echo from said obstruction, and means associated with said pressure responsive device for
tuning said receiving means to the frequency of echoes from the
tubing collars of said tubing sections to clearly
distinguish the ech18
oes from said couplings from each other.
The claim was held invalid because the point of novelty was described in terms of function rather than of structure. The specification disclosed a resonator as the crucial element in the combination,
but gave no indication that the patentee contemplated any specific
structural alternative for the resonator. The issue was one of undue
breadth: "Yet if Walker's [patent] claims be valid, no device to clarify echo waves, now known or hereafter invented, whether the device be an actual equivalent of Walker's ingredient or not, could be
used in a combination such as this, during the life of Walker's
patent."19
The court distinguished this case from the Continental Paper
18. Halliburton,329 U.S. at 9 n.7.
19. Id. at 12.
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Bag case on the ground that the Continental Paper Bag claims
structurally described the physical and operating relationships of all
of the crucial parts of the novel combination. In Halliburton, however, the patent claims were simply too broad and did not adequately describe the alleged invention. The Halliburton case thus
propriety of means clauses, particucast considerable doubt on the
20
larly at the point of novelty.
Numerous other cases decided during this era further clouded
the issue. In Faulkner v. Gibbs,21 for example, the Supreme Court
held valid a claim that recited over the prior art at two points of novelty through the use of means clauses, on the basis that the claim
recited a "true combination." Although Faulkner did not overrule
Halliburton, it breathed new life into the usage of means clauses
generally; in other words, the use of the word "means" in a claim
was no longer considered to be a sufficient reason to invalidate or
refuse the claim. Nevertheless, the law regarding the propriety of
means-plus-function claim language remained unsettled. This led,
in 1952, to the addition of the following language to the patent
statutes:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a
means or step for performing a specified function, without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim
or
shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material
22
acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
This change modified the rule of Halliburton with respect to func23
tional claim drafting.
B.

POST-1952

ATTITUDE OF THE PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
TOWARD FUNCTIONAL CLAIM DRAFTING

The policy of the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) is to accept means-plus-function claim language in combination claims so
long as the claims particularly point out and distinctly claim the
subject matter that the applicant regards as his invention. 24 Although an element of a combination claim drafted in means-plusfunction language is vulnerable to anticipation by a greater body of
prior art than is an element drafted in terms of structure only,
means-plus-function claim limitations are often difficult to search.
20. See Blaustein, FunctionalClaims Under the Patent Act of 1952, 26 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 613, 616 (1958).
21. 338 U.S. 267 (1949).
22. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1982) (enacted by the Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 593, 66
Stat. 792 (1952).
23. See In re Atwood, 354 F.2d 365, 374 (C.C.P.A. 1966).
24. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1982).
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Thus, as a practical matter, some examiners, particularly those who
handle mechanical cases and who date from the pre-1952 era, are reluctant to grant such claims. Nevertheless, the Board of Appeals of
the PTO has specifically upheld claims having means-plus-function
limitations, even at the point of novelty of the invention.
In Ex parte Ball,25 for example, the Board of Appeals held patentable a claim having means clauses that recited an operation different from that disclosed in a prior art patent. In reaching its
conclusion, the Board made an analysis of the specification to ensure that the structure for practicing the claimed means was adequately disclosed. Thus, the use of "means" language in a claim, as
permitted by the last paragraph of section 112 of the United States
Code, Title 35, does not relieve the applicant of his duty to provide a
full disclosure of the invention, as required by the second paragraph
of section 112. In another case, the Board of Appeals held that a
means-plus-function clause in a claim is acceptable under the last
paragraph of section 112, even at the exact point of novelty in a com26
bination, if the claim is definite.
The Board of Appeals has continued to grapple with interpretations of means-plus-function claim language, recognizing that functional claim language, even when supported by structure in the
disclosure, will not be allowed where the claim reads on the prior
7
art.

2

The present position of the PTO regarding means-plus-function
claim language is set forth in section 706.03(c) of the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP). 2 8 The examiners are directed to
avoid rejecting a combination claim on the ground that the claim
distinguishes from the prior art solely on the basis of a means-plusfunction limitation. The examiners are cautioned, however, to ensure that the claim particularly points out and distinctly claims the
25. 1953 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 4.
26. Ex parte Mayer, 111 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 109, 110 (1956).
27. See, e.g., Ex parte Anderson, 101 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 128 (1953).
28. [The last paragraph I of 35 U.S.C. 112 [sic I has the effect of prohibiting the
rejection of a claim for a combination of elements (or steps) on the ground
that the claim distinguishes from the prior art solely in an element (or step)
defined as a "means" (or "step") coupled with a statement of function. However this provision of [the last paragraph] must always be considered as
subordinate to the provision of paragraph 2 that the claim particularly point
out and distinctly claim subject matter. If a claim [is] found to contain language approved by [the last paragraph,] such claim should always be tested
additionally for compliance with paragraph 2 and if it fails to comply with the
requirements of paragraph 2, the claim should be rejected and the reasons
fully stated.
PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFIcE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 706.03(c) (1976).

COMPUTER/LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. V

subject matter considered by the applicant to be his invention.29
C.

EARLY JuDicIAL AITrUDEs TOWARD THE

LAST PARAGRAPH OF 35

U.S.C. § 112

In one of the first Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
(C.C.P.A.) cases 30 to consider the last paragraph of section 112, the
court found functional statements in the claims relating to the
dimensions of tubes or conduits containing currents of molten glass
to be purely functional. At issue was language claiming "the cross
section of said [conduit] being sufficiently small to ensure to the
glass stream, flowing through said [section] as a result of the extraction of glass from the furnace, a speed sufficiently high to prevent
any back current through said [conduit]. '31 The specification provided no more detail to the required dimensions than the claims, a
32
deficiency deemed fatal.
The issue of the scope of prior art that may be read upon by
functional claim language was discussed by the C.C.P.A. in In re
Lundberg,33 wherein the application contained a means-plus-function claim and the specification described one embodiment distinct
from the prior art. The court held that, if the applicant's means
clause in a claim reads upon the prior art, the claim is anticipated
even if the specification describes a means that is not shown in the
prior art. The court emphasized that the disclosure requirement of
paragraph one of section 112 and the requirement of paragraph two
that the claims particularly point out and distinctly claim the invention are not diminished by the addition of the "means" language in
the last paragraph of that section. The court stated that the last paragraph must be read in light of the first two, and must be given an
interpretation consistent with the clear meaning of those
34
paragraphs.
In Siegel v. Watson, a district court disallowed language claiming a "means responsive to the vibrations of said diamond for [controlling] the position of the cutting disk on its [planetary] axis" as
being a statement of result rather than of function. 35 In a similar decision, a claim was held invalid because a critical element was not
mentioned either structurally or as a means or step for performing a
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
In re Arbeit, 206 F.2d 947 (C.C.P.A. 1953).
Id. at 953.
1956).
See also Sola Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 146 F. Supp. 625 (N.D. Ill.
244 F.2d 543 (C.C.P.A. 1957).
Id. See also In re Henatsch, 298 F.2d 954 (C.C.P.A. 1962).
Siegel v. Watson, 156 F. Supp. 820, 822 (D.D.C. 1957).
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specified function in that claim. 36 The court noted that section 112
specifically permits the patentee to omit specific structural details
shown in the specification from his claims, but only when an element in the claim is expressed as a means for performing a specified
37
function.
Some of the early appellate court cases displayed reluctance to
accept the provisions of the last paragraph of section 112. One case,
decided in the Fifth Circuit in 1958, went against legislative history
and held that the word "means" or its equivalent synonyms "cannot
be used to describe the invention at the very point of novelty for to
do so would then be to define invention in terms of the result. ' 38 In
S.D. Warren Co. v. Nashua Gummed & Coated Paper Co., 39 the requirement of the earlier law, that a statement of functional result at
the precise point of novelty renders the claim unpatentable, was
stated without any consideration of the statutory changes regarding
functional claim drafting. Stearns v. Tinker & Rasor 4° held that a
means clause recited to cover an element is anticipated by any
structure that performs the same function not just equivalent structures. 4 1Relying on Stearns, the court in Del Francia v. Stanthony
Corp. stated that "[w]hile the claims must be read in the light of
the disclosure of the specifications, this does not restrict the invention to the precise structure disclosed, but rather to the real invention as found in the specifications and drawings. '42 As a result, the
court narrowly construed the "means" language in the claims and
affirmed a finding that the claims had not been infringed.
D.

SINGLE MEANS CLAIMS

The last paragraph of section 112 states that "an element in a
43 It
.
has been argued, however, that the second paragraph of section 112
was meant by Congress to sanction any form of claiming that particularly points out what an applicant regards as his invention, and
that there is no prohibition of single means claims in the final
paragraph. 44
The problem with a single means claim is that it covers every

claim for a combination may be expressed as a means . .

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Winslow Mfg. Co. v. Peerless Gauge Co., 202 F. Supp. 931 (N.D. Ohio 1958).
Id. at 935.
Bryan v. Sid W. Richardson, Inc., 254 F.2d 191, 194 (5th Cir. 1958).
205 F.2d 602 (lst Cir. 1953).
252 F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1957).
278 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1960).
Id. at 747.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (1982) (emphasis added).
In re Hyatt, 708 F.2d 712 (C.A.F.C. 1983).
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conceivable means for achieving the stated result, while the specification discloses at most only those means known to the inventor. In
45
other words, a single means claim tends to be too broad.
It is unclear whether a single means claim is more properly rejected under the first paragraph of section 112 on the basis that the
"enabling" disclosure is not commensurate in scope with the
claimed subject matter,46 or under the second paragraph of that section on the basis that the claim fails to clearly point out the invention. The C.A.F.C. has elected to avoid the issue as academic and
will reject single means claims based broadly on section 112. 47 The
final paragraph of section 112, however, saves combination claims
drafted using a means-plus-function format from this problem by
providing a construction of that format narrow enough to avoid the
undue breadth problem.
The language (of the final paragraph of Section 112) does not go so
far as to permit a so-called single means claim, that is, a claim
which recites merely one means plus a statement of function and
elenothing else. Attempts to evade this by adding purely nominal
48
ments to such a claim will undoubtedly be condemned.
III.

ISSUES CONCERNING COMPUTER
RELATED INVENTIONS

Issues that arise under the last paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 in
connection with computer related inventions are basically the same
issues that occur in connection with other types of inventions. Particular problems that arise in connection with computer related inventions are a result more of the nature of computers themselves
than of section 112.
For example, a number of cases in the United States have dealt
with the adequacy of disclosure to support claims in computer related cases that are drafted in means-plus-function language. One
problem involving disclosure is that it is not possible to point out
particular electronic components interconnected to perform a specific function in a disclosure that merely identifies a general purpose
digital computer and describes a program flow chart. How much
disclosure is required to support computer related means-plus-function claims that themselves do not recite any specific structure?
45. See, e.g., O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 402, 425-27 (1853); In re Borkowski, 422 F.2d 904 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
46. O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 402, 425-27 (1853).
47. In re Hyatt, 708 F.2d 712, 714 (C.A.F.C. 1983).
48. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-110 (West
1954), at 26.
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In computer related cases, means-plus-function claims may be
considered either statutory or nonstatutory, depending upon their
scope. Should a means-plus-function claim that covers any apparatus for effecting a result be treated differently than a method claim
in making this determination? If the scope of the claims is interpreted broadly enough to read on a mental process or on an individual using pencil and paper to perform a calculation, is the claim
statutory or nonstatutory?
There are also particular problems involving equivalents in computer related cases. For example, is a means-plus-function claim
that is supported by a programmed computer specification broad
enough, for infringement purposes, to read upon a hard-wired or
mechanical "equivalent"? On the other hand, what is the scope of
prior art that is applicable to such claims? Do hard-wired or
mechanical systems that perform the same function as the meansplus-function claims constitute prior art? This section addresses
some of these questions.
A.

DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS

A claim on a combination written in means-plus-function language is to be construed to "cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents
thereof. '49 The specification must, however, describe the invention
in "the manner and process of making and using it, in such full,
clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the
art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to
make and use the same. '50 A problem that commonly occurs in
computer related patent applications having means-plus-function
claim limitations is finding support for the limitations in a specification that typically describes the programming of a general purpose
computer by the use of flow charts. Is a flow chart disclosure of a
programmed general purpose computer enough? This issue was ad51
dressed by the C.C.P.A. in In re Knowlton.
The invention in Knowlton related to a list processor, which involves a system for computer processing of items of information that
are related or have characteristics in common. The specification included schematic block diagrams, related to various aspects of the
invention, descriptions of the drawings, in which the relationships
among the depicted components of the invention were generally described, a number of computer program listings, and descriptions of
49. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1982).
50. Id.
51. 481 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
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how the listed programs work with a general purpose digital computer. The claims were all drafted in means-plus-function claim format, most calling for "means for organizing a memory into storage
blocks, means for specifying fields in such storage blocks, base registers for holding pointer signals to the blocks, and processing
means using the pointer signals for operating on the contents of the
'52
specified fields.
A rejection due to inadequacy of disclosure applied by the patent examiner was based upon the position that each instruction in
the program did not uniquely and unambiguously define an apparatus configuration. The thrust of the argument was that, in order to
provide adequate disclosure in a computer implemented system, the
separate microstructure of the computer during each program step
would have to be shown. Such a disclosure is of course virtually impossible. The Board of Patent Appeals accepted the disclosure as
being adequate insofar as the programs detailed in the specification
would be effective to operate a computer to carry out the invention.
Nevertheless, the Board held that the claims, which were written in
functional language, would preempt every possible hardware configuration that would give the same ultimate result. The Board felt
that, since a programmed general purpose computer bears no discernable apparatus relationship to a specially constructed machine,
the invention was overclaimed; that is, it preempted more than what
was disclosed by the specification.
The C.C.P.A. reversed the examiner and the Board on the basis
that the specification did disclose an apparatus in the form of a particular general purpose computer as well as memory, base registers,
and other more specific hardware items that performed each of the
functions called for by the means-plus-function recitation of the
claims. 53 Those skilled in the art to which the application was directed would know the types of hardware designated by the terms
and would know that the necessary hardware was available. The
C.C.P.A. noted that the disclosure was not sketchy, but rather went
into considerable detail in explaining the interrelationships among
the disclosed hardware elements. 54 Although the computer microstructure that results when the applicant's program is loaded into
the computer was not described, the C.C.P.A. recognized that a balance must be drawn: "[hIowever, it must be borne in mind that the
disclosure need not only be full, clear and exact to satisfy the statute, it must also be concise in that the disclosure is related to those
52. Id. at 1361.
53. Id. at 1367-69.
54. Id.
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55
skilled in the art."
5
In In re Noll, 6 the claims were drawn to an apparatus for scanconverting a sequence of data bits into a sequence of signals for the
display of text or other information on a video screen. The specification disclosed a programmable data processor operating in the scan
conversion under the control of a program, whereas the prior art
used hardware circuitry. The examiner allowed the first claim,
which was the only independent claim in the application:
1. A computer graphics system for displaying in a multi-line,
multi-point-per-line format images corresponding to a sequence
of input display commands comprising
(A) a programmable data processor operating under the control of a program to convert said display commands into data
entries in an array of multi-bit data words, each entry in said array corresponding to a discrete point in the image to be
displayed,
(B) a scanned-raster display device for generating illuminated
points on a display surface in response to applied data signals
and
(C) means intermediate said data processor and said display
device and cooperating with said data processor for sequentially
accessing said
words in said array for presentation to said dis57
play device.
The second claim is exemplary of the dependent claims that
were rejected by the examiner as being based upon an inadequate
disclosure and inferentially as failing to properly define the
invention:
2. Apparatus according to claim 1, wherein said program controlled data processor comprises
(1) a memory storing data signal including program control
signals and said array of data words, and,
(2) process means responsive to said program control signals
stored in said memory for
(a) interpreting input display commands,
(b) converting said input display commands into location signals for controlling the storage of corresponding digital signals
in said array, and
(c) selectively reading data from said array, said means for selectively reading also being responsive to signals from said in58
termediate means.
The examiner distinguished claim 1, which was considered

55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 1367.
545 F.2d 141 (C.C.P.A. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977).
Id. at 144.
Id.
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properly supportable in the specification, from claim 2, which was
not, on the basis that claim 1 was adequately supported by a
programmable data processor and sufficient flow charts as well as citation of a specific general purpose computer, while claim 2 attempted to extend claim 1 to a specific apparatus contained within
the data processor. The examiner required a showing of the particular structure within the computer that was conditioned by the operation of the program.
The C.C.P.A. reversed, pointing out that a programmed computer comprises physical structure, including storage devices and
electrical components uniquely configured to perform specified
functions through the physical properties of electrical circuits to
achieve controlled results. 59 Furthermore, the invention was limited
to computer graphics systems, and did not encompass other types of
machines for achieving the results.
In a similar case, In re Comstock, 60 the application related to an
electronic calculator having as its principal feature a means for retrieving numerical data placed in storage on a first-in, first-out basis.
The claims were apparatus claims drafted in means-plus-function
language. The court ruled that the specification sufficiently disclosed the structure to support means-plus-function claim language
on the basis of a general reference in the specification to the structure of an IBM 1620 computer, together with flow charts describing
the necessary programming. 6 1
Thus, it appears to be well settled that a disclosure of a general
purpose digital computer, together with a disclosure of programming for operating the computer to perform the function set forth in
the means-plus-function claims, is sufficient. Care must be taken,
however, to ensure that the disclosure of the programming is adequate to enable one of ordinary skill in the art to practice the
invention.
B.

MEANS-PLus-FUNCTION CLAiM LANGUAGE AND MENTAL STEPS

Functional limitations in claims are broader than structural limitations. In the context of a computer related invention, means-plusfunction language can sometimes be construed broadly enough to
cover a human being as one or more of the means, using pencil, paper, ruler, and the like. In In re Prater,62 the invention was a
method and apparatus for processing conventionally obtained data
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 148.
481 F.2d 905 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
Id. at 909-10.
415 F.2d 1378 (C.C.P.A. 1968).
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to produce a spectrographic analysis of a known mixture, and to determine unknown component concentrations with minimum error.
A number of method claims as well as a single apparatus claim were
at issue. The method claims were rejected by the examiner as being
unpatentable mental processes. The apparatus claim was rejected
as being unpatentable over the prior art as well as for failing to
properly define the invention since, although the disclosed invention
was practiced on an analog computer, the claim language was considered broad enough to read on a properly programmed general
purpose digital computer. The C.C.P.A. held, as to the method
claims, that patent protection should not be denied merely because
method claims can alternatively be read on a process performed
through the human mind by the use of aids such as a pencil and paper.63 The apparatus claim was also found to be patentable because
it was the apparatus counterpart of one of the patentable method
64
claims.
Upon rehearing, however, the C.C.P.A. reversed itself as to the
method claims on the basis that those claims were too broad, even
when read in light of the specification, since the method could be
65
practiced by a human being making pencil and paper markings.
The apparatus claim, however, was held patentable on the basis that
the claim was written in typical means-plus-function language as expressly permitted by the third paragraph of section 112. The court
held that, as a matter of law, "[t]he pencil, paper and ruler-referred to by the board in regard to 35 U.S.C. § 102-do not anticipate
the claimed 'means' since the former additionally require human
'66
manipulation.
The mental steps issue has been raised in several other cases in
the United States. In In re,Bernhart,67 for example, the invention involved a method and apparatus for automatically making a two-dimensional portrayal of a three-dimensional object from any desired
angle and distance and on any desired plane of projection. Equations defining the geometric relationship between the two-dimensional and three-dimensional coordinates were used to control the
operation of the computer, which in turn controlled the operation of
a plotting machine.
The examiner rejected the claims on, among others, the ground
that the novelty in the claims (presumably the programming
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 1389.
Id.
In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1401-05 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
Id. at 1406.
417 F.2d 1395 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
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means) did not constitute a structural difference over the prior art,
and was therefore predicated for patentability on mental steps. The
C.C.P.A. reversed the rejection on the ground that the apparatus
claims contained no recitation of mental steps or of any element requiring or even permitting the incorporation of human facilities on
the apparatus.
These claims recite, and can be infringed only by, a digital computer in a certain physical condition, i.e., electromechanically set or
programmed to carry out the recited routine. The claims also define
the invention as having plotting means for drawing lines or for illustrating an object. When such functional language is used in a claim,
35 U.S.C. § 112 states that "such claim shall be construed to cover
the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof." The specification here mentions
only mechanical drafting machines. The claims therefore cover,
under section 112, only such mechanical drafting machines and
their equivalents. We know of no authority for holding that a
human being, such as a draftsman, could ever be the equivalent of a
machine disclosed in a patent application, and we are not prepared
to so hold in this case. Accordingly, we think it clear that applicants have not defined as their invention 6anything
in which the
8
human mind could be used as a component.
Thus, the mental steps doctrine does not apply where the
claimed invention is clearly an apparatus, even if the claims contain
means-plus-function limitations. But the claims will presumably not
escape a mental steps rejection if the means-plus-function limitations are so broad that the claim as a whole actually defines a process because it covers every conceivable apparatus for effecting that
process. Overlap between means-plus-function claim language and
process (method) claim language is referred to herein as "apparatus-method claim duality."
C.

MEANS-PLUS-FUNCTION CLAIMS AND

APPARATUS-METHOD CLAIM DuALITY

In In re Meyer, 69 the invention was directed toward an apparatus and method involving a programmed computer to test a complex
system for possible malfunctions. The invention was designed for
application in diagnosing the nervous system of a human being and,
in particular, neural pathways. The method claims were held to be
nonstatutory since they recited a mathematical algorithm, representing a mental process that a neurologist should follow. 70 The ap68. Id. at 1399.
69. 688 F.2d 789 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
70. Id. at 795.
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paratus claims, drafted in means-plus-function language, differed
from the method claims by reciting "means for performing" the
steps set forth in the method claims, and "means for displaying" the
results. The court held that "such claims are treated as indistinguishable from the method claims for the purposes of section 101
unless it is demonstrated that the claims are drawn to specific apparatus distinct from other apparatus capable of performing the identi'71
cal function.
Similarly, in In re Abele, 7 2 the C.C.P.A. refused to distinguish
apparatus claims drafted in broad means-plus-function language
from corresponding unpatentable process claims in an invention using a computer-based system to improve image processing and axial
tomography. The court rejected an apparatus claim as being a counterpart to a process claim that was considered to be directed solely
to a mathematical algorithm portion of the applicant's invention.
In In re Walter, 73 both the patent examiner and the Board of
Appeals refused to consider the appellant's method and apparatus
claims separately because they were deemed indistinguishable. The
C.C.P.A. addressed this issue, stating:
This problem arises in computer-arts inventions when the structure
in apparatus claims is defined only as "means for" performing specified functions as sanctioned by 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph. If
the functionally-defined disclosed means and their equivalents are
so broad that they encompass any and every means for performing
the recited functions, the apparatus claim is an attempt to exhalt
form over substance since the claim is really to a method or series
of functions itself. In computer-related inventions, the recited
means also perform the function of "number crunching" (solving
mathematical algorithms and making calculations). In such cases
the burden must be placed on the applicant to demonstrate that the
claims are truly drawn to specific apparatus distinct from other apparatus capable of performing identical functions.
If this burden has not been discharged, the apparatus claim will
be treated as if it were drawn to the method or process which encompasses all of the claimed "means"...... The statutory nature of
the claim under § 101 will then
depend upon whether the corre74
sponding method is statutory.
Thus, an otherwise unpatentable method cannot be indirectly
claimed by drafting a corresponding apparatus claim in means-plusfunction language of a scope broad enough to substantially encompass the method. The means-plus-function claim will be examined
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 795 n.3 (citing In re Pardo, 684 F.2d 912, 916 n.6 (C.C.P.A. 1982)).
684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
618 F.2d 758 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
Id. at 768.
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to determine whether or not the claim, in substance, is to a method
constituted by the series of functions recited in the claim. The corresponding method will then be analyzed to determine whether or
not it constitutes statutory subject matter. Therefore, the apparatus
claim will survive only if the corresponding method is deemed
statutory.
Even if an invention is claimed in terms of means-plus-function
apparatus limitations, one may argue that the invention should be
treated as a method if language in the specification inferentially
shows that the invention is in methodology, rather than in apparatus. In In re Knowlton, 75 for example, the specification stated that
"[i] nsofar as the present invention is concerned, the essence of applicant's contribution lies in the cooperative effect of the functional
means, and not in any specific implementation of these functions. '76
The inference that a programmed computer is effectively the practicing of a method rather than an apparatus is buttressed by the fact
that program steps are performed sequentially, and there is no reliance on any particular apparatus at any single point in time to perform the function. The C.C.P.A. rejected this theory on the basis
that language in the specification suggesting that the invention is a
process only constitutes evidence that the claims were directed to
something other than what the applicant regards as his invention.
That evidence, however, was in this case refuted by the rest of the
application including the claims as filed, as well as by the appellant's position throughout the pendency of the application, all indicating the invention to be an apparatus for processing list
77
information.
Finally, the invention in In re Johnston78 was directed toward an
automatic financial record keeping system employing a digital computer. Portions of the claimed apparatus were defined as being a
means for identifying an account or type of transaction. The Board
of Appeals affirmed the rejection of the apparatus claims on the basis that a means for identifying an account or type of transaction,
even though represented by a section of computer memory, is in the
mind of the user and cannot define any characteristic of an apparatus. The rejection was reversed by the C.C.P.A., with the following
commentary:
[W]e find the appealed apparatus claims clearly read only upon
the subject matter which appellant regards as his invention-a "rec75. 481 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
76. Id. at 1363 (quoting the applicant's specification).
77. Id. at 1368-69.
78. 502 F.2d 765 (C.C.P.A. 1974), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976) (invention held unpatentable on grounds of obviousness).
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ord-keeping machine system for financial accounts" ...- not a
human being inside or outside appellant's apparatus. Appellant's
specification makes it quite clear that the claimed apparatus automatically performs the identifying operations referred to by the
board; those operations are neither actually performed by a human
being, nor can we imagine how they could be realistically performed by a human being.7 9
D. MEANS-PLus-FUNCTION CLAIMS

AND METHODS

OF DOING BUSINESS
In some cases, the question arises whether or not a computerbased system, operating in a business environment and defined in
terms of means-plus-function claims, is arguably a method of doing
business and therefore unpatentable as not constituting statutory
subject matter. In Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,80 the invention was directed toward a computer-based system for controlling a cash management
account that provided a brokerage security account, a number of
money market funds, and a charge/checking account. Although all
three types of accounts were previously available to the public, the
combination of the three types of accounts by computer provided
synergistic benefits in the way that funds were transferred among
the accounts so as not to lie idle. The claims included means-plusfunction language defining how data are moved among accounts.
The validity of the patent was challenged on the basis that the
claims were unpatentable because they defined nothing more than
the combination of familiar business systems. The claims were alleged to be an attempt to obscure the fact that the invention was
merely a business system, with the claims drafted to recite a combination of various means for performing certain functions. The
claims were further alleged to fit squarely into the business system
category, having nothing to do with an apparatus since the invention
could be practiced by hand with the aid of paper, pencil, and
telephone.
In the action for declaratory judgment of noninfringement and
invalidity, the court found the patent valid under 35 U.S.C. § 101 on
the ground that, although patentability of inventions that are essentially mathematical algorithms is proscribed by section 101, no mathematical algorithm was involved. Without considering whether or
not the functions defined by the claims could have been practiced
by a human being without the aid of a machine, the court noted that
79. 502 F.2d at 770.
80. 564 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Del. 1983).
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the claims did not involve a procedure for solving a mathematical
problem, but rather were directed toward a methodology to effectuate a highly efficient business system. 81 In determining whether
there was statutory subject matter, the court did not consider the
product of the claimed invention, but focused instead on the methodology for achieving the product, believing this to be the proper fo82
cus of analysis.
Regarding the challenge to the patent on the ground that the
claims defined nothing more than familiar business systems, the
court noted that the product of the claims was unpatentable if done
by hand. However, the claims taught a method of operating a computer. The court ignored the argument that the focus of the claims
was indeed on the service provided by the invention rather than on
83
the method by which the services were provided.
The case may express an interpretation of section 101 that is too
liberal, but if followed it suggests that any type of computer-based
system is statutory. It would thus be possible to convert subject
matter traditionally held to be unpatentable, such as rules of playing a game or methods of doing business, into statutory subject matter merely by practicing the subject matter with a computer.
E.

MEANS-PLus-FNCTION CLAIMS AND THE APPLICABLE PRIOR ART

During examination of a patent application, the patent examiner
is charged with the responsibility of applying against the claims any
subject matter in the prior art literally covered by the claims, construing the claims as broadly as is reasonable. 84 In computer-related
cases, where the operation of a programmed general purpose digital
computer is claimed using means-plus-function claim language or
method claims of equivalent scope, a question arises as to the scope
of the applicable prior art. Simply put, is it appropriate to apply
non-computer-related prior art, such as hard-wired circuitry or
mechanical elements, against functional claims supported in the
specification by a computer implementation?
The answer is that systems of any type, hard-wired, electromechanical, mechanical, or computer-based will be applied as
prior art against means-plus-function claims if the system literally
reads on the claim. This is true even if the embodiment shown in
the specification is a programmed computer. If the applicant desires
81. Id. at 1368.
82. Id. at 1368-69.
83. Id. at 1366-68.
84. MANUiAL
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the scope of the claims to be limited to a programmed system, then
the claims should be written as such. Thus, a claim limitation expressed in means-plus-function language will be anticipated by any
means in the prior art capable of performing the indicated
85
function.
For example, the claim limitation "means for moving a component between points A and B along a trajectory defined by the equation.. ." reads upon prior art defined by a mechanical cam having a
profile that satisfies the equation and is arranged to control the
movement of a member between two points. Conversely, the claim
limitation "computer means for . . ." or "programming means for
. . ." would presumably not be met by the cam, since this claim is
86
specifically limited to a computer based environment.
In Digitronics Corp. v. New York Racing Association, Inc *87 the
patent was directed toward a digital computer-based, parimutuel
betting system to be used at a racetrack. The computer was
programmed to issue betting tickets through dispensing machines,
gather betting data, and provide bookkeeping for each race. The total bet on each horse in each race was periodically displayed on a
tote board as well as at a central monitoring station. Although electromechanical totalizators had been used for some time in the prior
art, and the use of electronics in a totalizator system was at least ten
years old before the application was fied, Digitronics was apparently the first to successfully develop a digital computer-based parimutuel betting system. The system, besides performing all of the
functions previously performed by totalizator systems, also provided
system checks to improve data accuracy and to reject unacceptable
85. Id. § 706.03(c).
86. The following claim appeared in the first reported decision on software patentability in the United Kingdom:
Linear programming means for use in controlling data processing apparatus
so that it effects iterative processing on a set of data representations, which
means are formed in such manner as to cause the initiation of an iteration
while a previously-initiated iteration is still proceeding, so that a plurality of
iterations will proceed concurrently at one or more stages of the processing.
Beresford, The Protectionof Inventions in Computer Programmesin the United Kingdom, ANNUAL OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY LAw 384, 387 (1975) (quoting Slee & Harris's
application, 1966 Pat. Cas. 194).
This claim was held patentable on the ground that the means could be likened to
a cam shaped according to a certain formula so that, when fixed into a machine, it
controlled the latter in a certain way. Even so, if this claim were examined in the
United States, it would probably not be considered patentable, both because the
claim is a single means type claim, proscribed by U.S. law, and because the claim defines more a desired result than a structure to effect a desired result.
87. 187 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 602 (E.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 553 F.2d 740 (2d Cir. 1977).
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wagers such as an attempted wager on a scratched entry. Claim 1
was as follows:
1. A data processor for processing transaction signals
comprising:
(A) a plurality of pairs of units, each unit of each pair performing the same function as the other unit but with one operating
as a master unit and the other as a slave unit,
(B) a master selecting means for selecting which unit of each
pair of units is a master and which is a slave and for changing the
selection upon receipt of an erroneous-transaction indicating signal
only from the selected master unit, and
(C) checking means responsive to transaction signals being
processed in each unit of a pair of units for checking for erroneous
transaction signals [and] for transmitting an erroneous-transaction
indicating signal to said master selecting means so that if the
master unit caused said erroneous-transaction signal, said master
88
selecting means then selects the slave unit to be the master unit.

The patent claims were held to be unpatentable over prior art
electromechanical parimutuel totalizators (shown in a patent to
Handley) even though none employed a programmed digital computer. The primary reference applied against Digitronics was a patent issued in 1944 on an electromechanical totalizator that used
relays and solenoids to issue tickets, totalize transactions, report
statistics, and monitor wages made on scratched horses.8 9
The court placed no significance on the fact that the prior art
patent had nothing to do with electronic data processing:
That Handley is essentially electromechanical and not an electronic
digital processing system does not distinguish it. Plaintiff's patent
is not on a new, unobviously new means of substituting EDP components in familiar racetrack circuitry. It does not limit its claims
to EDP components. The patent claims in issue are systems claims,
each consisting in a combination of inclusively indicated means
that consist in reality of circuitry connecting conventional elements
for conventional uses, the whole enacting an old scenario.
... The detailed consideration of Handley demonstrates the
overall absence of patentable novelty in the patent in suit. It brings
out sharply the extent to which familiar circuits have long handled
familiar tasks, and that the plaintiff's patentees brought no new discovery to the task but only a routine choice of familiar but newer
means to replace the older ones of Handley in the same union of
means. The union embraced in each claim Handley shows to be itself old, the asserted differences between Handley and the plaintiff's patent that plaintiff relies on, emphasizing differences in the
88. 187 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 620-21.
89. See 187 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 632-37.
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means and not in the combinations or unions of means that,
broadly, were equivalents, underline the want of novelty in the
on the patentable novelty of
union of means-the combinations,
90
which validity absolutely depends.
F.

MEANS-PLUS-FUNCTION CLAIMS AND INFRINGEMENT

The question of what constitutes infringement of means-plusfunction claims is related to the previously addressed question of
what constitutes applicable prior art. In either case, the scope of
subject matter considered analogous or equivalent to the subject
matter claimed in means-plus-function language must be determined. This raises two additional questions. First, will a mechanical or hard-wired system infringe claims written in means-plusfunction language where the disclosed embodiment is a computer?
Second, if a disclosed embodiment does not involve a computer, will
it be infringed by a programmed system that performs the same
functions as the claims? There have been no United States cases directly on point.9 1 In Bullard Co. v. General Electric Co.,92 plaintiff's
two patents were directed toward machine control. One of the patents performed machine control mechanically whereas the other
was electromechanical. The defendant's alleged infringing device
operated electronically, using punched tape. The court avoided the
question of whether electronic operation is an equivalent of
infringing device
mechanical operation by finding that the alleged
93
did not contain all of the elements of any claim.
In Digitronics, the claims that were directed toward a data
processor for processing transaction signals and that were disclosed
in the specification as a programmed computer were held to be unpatentable over prior art. 94 In dicta, however, the court discussed
the question of whether or not the claims would have been infringed
by a computer programmed to perform the functions described in
the means-plus-function claim language. The court held that such
claims are not infringed by a programmed computer on the ground
that the various means recited in the claims did not exist simultaneously in a programmed computer. The defendant characterized the
issue as follows:
Simply stated, the basic issue posed is whether an apparatus claim
for combination of old elements (as distinguished from a process
claim) can be infringed where the recited elements exist only in se90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

187 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 635-37.
See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
348 F.2d 985 (4th Cir. 1965).
Id. at 988.
See supra text accompanying notes 87-90.
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quenced transitory states through the interaction of sequentially
operative software 'program' instructions with elements of available
as
standardized and multifunctional circuitry and do not coexist
95
physically identifiable entities at any given instant of time.
Non-infringement was thus based on a finding that a combination
claim is not infringed by a machine system that does not include the
same combination of means, and that only performs the function to
which the patented combination of means is addressed when its
general purpose digital computer element is programmed. The
court further stated that: "It is not the computer-the machine qua
computer-that performs the function, but, rather the machine function of the patent is attained only through the 'use' of the generalpurpose computer." 96 The court considered a programmed system
to constitute not a machine means but rather the new use of a
known machine, a process. Since means-plus-function language
constitutes apparatus, there was no infringement.
The court ignored the plaintiffs better reasoned argument that
the physically stored program endows a data processor with the capability of functioning in particular ways. The plaintiffs argument
was that the program transformed the general purpose computer
into a physical means of performing a function. In this way, the
computer temporarily embodied the union of means set forth in the
claims. Although the various interconnections of components of a
computer are not simultaneously connected when the program is
loaded, the general purpose computer, properly programmed, physically harbors in its components the physical means that make it capable of performing the functions defined in the claims. 97 The dicta
in Digitronics are based upon a misconception of computers, emphasizing formalistic rather than substantive qualities of the machines, and should not be widely followed.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Because computer related inventions are more appropriately
characterized by function than by structure, claims language defining such an invention should be as functional as possible. Functional language avoids limiting the scope of the claimed invention to
a particular apparatus structure when in practice computer implemented functions can usually be provided by a number of different
95. Digitronics Corp. v. New York Racing Ass'n, Inc., 187 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 602, 639
(E.D.N.Y. 1975), affd, 553 F.2d 740 (2d Cir. 1977).
96. Id. at 640.
97. See In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395, 1400 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
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structures. Yet the claim language must adequately distinguish the
invention over the prior art.
Functional claims incorporating means-plus-function limitations
may be patentable, even if means-plus-function language appears at
the point of novelty of the invention. The invention must, however,
be definite and commensurate in scope with the invention disclosed
in the specification. A claim including means-plus-function language must define all of the necessary elements to cause an invention to carry out a desired result. Otherwise, the claim may be
considered to define merely a desired result, rather than sufficient
structure to provide that result.
A claim including a means-plus-function limitation must define
a combination of elements, that is, more than one means or structural element that cooperate with each other to effect a desired result. If there is only a single means recited in the claim, a
"combination" cannot be artificially created by including token additional means or elements to avoid a rejection.
The specification must provide a sufficient disclosure of hardware and software to enable a person skilled in the computer arts to
practice the invention without undue experimentation. A detailed
flow chart describing programming, together with identification of a
general purpose computer, is usually sufficient. It is not necessary
to be able to read each element of a claim on the specification, nor is
it necessary for all claimed elements to exist simultaneously within
a computer.
During examination, any prior art that performs the same functions as those defined in the means-plus-function claim limitations
will be applicable as an anticipation. Thus, even if the specification
is limited to a programmed general purpose computer, the examiner
will probably apply prior art disclosed in a hard-wired or mechanical
apparatus that performs the same function as the claimed invention
against the claims. In order to render obvious a programmed system claimed as a combination of means-plus-function limitations, a
prior art, hard-wired apparatus performing one function may arguably be combinable with a prior art, programmed computer performing a similar function. However, a mechanical element in the prior
art for performing one of the functions should not be included in the
rejection because it is nonanalogous. Thus, to reduce the scope of
applicable prior art, it is preferable to limit claims to a computerbased system environment, unless the invention has applicability
outside that environment.
What constitutes infringement of a means-plus-function claim in
a computer-type case has not been established. Dicta in one district
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court decision have adopted the view that a means-plus-function
claim is not infringed by a programmed computer that performs the
claimed function because the means-plus-function elements of the
claim do not exist in the computer simultaneously. 98 The better reasoned view adopted by the C.A.F.C. in its decisions involving patentability, however, is that a programmed computer is a storehouse of
parts that are successively interconnected in accordance with the
program but which nevertheless exist simultaneously. 9 9 To be on
the safe side, method claims characterizing a computer or software
related invention as a new method of operating a general purpose
computer, as well as apparatus claims, should be included.

98. Digitronics Corp. v. New York Racing Ass'n, Inc., 187 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 602, 639
(E.D.N.Y. 1975), affd, 553 F.2d 740 (2d Cir. 1977).
99. See In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1403 n.29 (C.C.P.A. 1969); In re Bernhart, 417
F.2d 1395, 1400 (C.C.P.A. 1969).

